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1.  introduction
Basing the economic systems of EU countries on the doctrine of market lib-
eralism caused an idealized market to be perceived as the best way to maximize 
profits, not from the production of material goods and their distribution, but 
through the provision of broadly defined financial services. This was evidenced 
by the development of a range of financial products (quasi-money), removal of 
financial capital from the sphere of material goods production and investing it 
in risky financial transactions, giving impetus to the process of financialization, 
as it was described by P. H. Dembinski [5]. The development of information and 
communication technologies further accelerated this process. This free-market 
euphoria and building a future based on an investment utopia was also served by 
erroneous theories, supported by mathematical models and the Bank of Sweden 
Prize in Economic Sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, supposedly indicating 
effective ways of investing (by businesses and residents) in capital markets.
Examples of such award-winning theories and models include work by 
co-creators of so-called financial engineering or financial mathematics – Myron 
Scholes and Robert Merton (they received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1997). 
Their model for pricing derivatives, focusing on long term contracts, was to help 
investors minimize investment risk. It soon became apparent that these were false 
hopes, since an investment fund called Long-Term Capital Management that they 
founded on this supposedly profitable strategy quickly failed and investors lost 
 * Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Cracow University
 ** AGH University of Science and Technology
8Marianna Księżyk, Marek Ł. Michalski
USD 4.6 billion [24, p. 41]. E. Prescott’s (Nobel laureate in economics in 2004 
for his work on business cycles) theory also proved to be false. In 2000, he as-
serted with the help of economic theory and econometrics that financial markets 
are rational (they function rationally). A few months later, the “internet bubble” 
burst with share prices dropping 50%. This fact can be regarded as a disaster 
from which some financial markets, such as Nasdaq, have not recovered until 
this day [5, p. 17].
The financial crisis that started in 2008 shows that financialization, as the di-
rect cause of this crisis, not only shook the belief in free markets, but also showed 
that neoliberal theories, as a basis for economic processes, despite the develop-
ment of an extensive methodology (i.e. statistical and mathematical models) 
which is intended to aid making rational decisions, do not ensure sustainable 
economic growth and standard of living improvement for society as a whole. 
It also indicates that studies limited to direct causes of financialization and its 
impact on financial crises are inadequate. A thorough explanation of the sources 
of this process and its socio-economic impact under the current process of glo-
balization, is required.
Recognizing that these problems are pertinent to the realization of objec-
tives that were at the foundation of European integration (i.e. prosperity, peace, 
democracy and human rights), this article shows the effects of financialization 
on achieving sustainable economic growth and living standards improvement of 
residents of countries with market economies, including Poland as an EU member. 
It also indicates a way out of the existing negative approaches forming the basis 
of financialization.
2.  Main sources of financialization
A characteristic feature of modern liberal market capitalism, which is called 
“casino capitalism” [21], “stock market capitalism” or the epoch of finance, in 
which “finance primarily finances finance” [12], are frequent financial crises turn-
ing into economic crises. Many authors (such as Stiglitz [20], Dembinski [5] and 
Otte [16]) seeing financialization as the direct cause of contemporary financial 
crises, analyze its symptoms, direct causes and effects of economic growth.
By contrast, Song Hongbing [9, 10] does not focus his research on causes, 
manifestations and direct consequences of financialization but on its sources. 
The primary source of financialization and financial crises, turning into global 
economic crises, is the issuance of money out of nothing by private central banks. 
Consequently, this led to the introduction of floating exchange rates and casino 
capitalism.
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Studies of financialization show that the residents of many countries, and 
even economists, are not aware of the socio-economic effects of the existence of 
private central banks, even in countries such as the United States or Great Britain, 
and of giving them full control over the issuance of money.
The private UK central bank was founded in 1694. The primary reason for 
creating the Bank of England was the desire to convert the debt of the king (Wil-
liam III) and his court into eternal government debt set up as a mortgage based 
on tax revenue. Thus, the Bank of England gained the exclusive right to issue 
national currency (it was given this exclusive right). The uniqueness of this project 
consisted in the absolute binding of issuing national currency with public debt. 
Whenever the need arose to issue new money, the only solution was to increase 
public debt [9, pp. 16–19].
The need to repay the interest on this debt and the need for continued eco-
nomic growth led to an increase in demand for money and loans. Hence, both 
public and private debt continues to grow. The interest charged on loans ends 
up in bankers’ wallets and the burden of repayment is borne by ordinary people.
Similarly to the Bank of England, the U.S. Federal Reserve is a private bank, 
which means that the Fed is not only not a federal bank, but it is also not a re-
serve. Starting from December 23, 1913, the U.S. federal government does not 
have the right to issue money and does not issue the U.S. dollar. After the assas-
sination of President Kennedy in 1963, the U.S. government  lost the authority 
to issue the “silver dollar”, the only means of payment that the government was 
still entitled to issue at that time. It is  noteworthy that president Kennedy was 
determined to keep this right as stated by Song Hongbing based on reliable U.S. 
documents [9, p. 62].
The Federal Reserve was designed to have all the characteristics of a private 
central bank and did not differ in any way from the private Bank of England that 
acted as the central bank of Great Britain. It was stipulated that private sharehold-
ers will be the owners of the Federal Reserve, which gave them the opportunity to 
reap huge profits from the issuance of money. Regional banks that make up the Fed 
are also not part of government structures. The idea that the government was 
entitled to 20% of its shares was rejected. According to Song Hongbing, the name 
“Federal Reserve System” was used in the Federal Reserve Act that founded the Fed 
in order to hide the true nature of this private central bank, as well as to comply 
with the constitution, which states that “The Congress shall have power to coin 
money and regulate the value thereof” [23, Art. 1, Sec. 8].
The Federal Reserve Act was passed in great haste. Most of the congressmen 
and senators did not even have time to carefully read the contents of the Act and 
to make appropriate amendments since the final draft was printed on Decem-
ber 22 at 4:30 AM, the final reading took place at 7 AM and voting in Congress 
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began at 11 PM all on the same day. The next day (December 23) the Act passed 
the Senate and on the same day, an hour after its adoption, it was signed into law 
by President W. Wilson. Its signing generated an explosion of joy on Wall Street 
and in the London City financial district.
The Federal Reserve Act was passed in such a haste that only a few congress-
men, including Ch. A. Lindbergh, were able to publicly point out its flaws. A pas-
sage from Lindbergh’s speech at the meeting of Congress should certainly be 
remembered: “The greatest crime of Congress is its currency system. The worst 
legislative crime of the ages is perpetrated by this banking bill. The caucus and 
the party bosses have again operated and prevented the people from getting 
the benefit of their own government” (Ch. Lindbergh, Speech in Congress, De-
cember 23, 1913, quoted by [9, pp. 82–83]).
Senator Aldrich also noted significant flaws in this act. In an interview for 
The Independent in 1914 he said: “Before the passage of this Act, New York bank-
ers could only dominate the reserves of New York. Now we are able to dominate 
the bank reserves of the entire country” [9, p. 83].
The introduction of the Federal Reserve Act meant that after more than 
a century of the bankers’ struggle with the U.S. government, international bank-
ers finally achieved their goal – they gained total control over the right to issue 
currency in the U.S.,  thus control  finance, trade and politics in America.
Following his presidency, the twenty-eighth president of the United States 
W. Wilson, who hurriedly signed the Federal Reserve Act into law, noticed his 
mistake and said: “A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit. 
Our system of credit is concentrated. The growth of the nation, therefore, and all 
our activities are in the hands of a few men.” (as cited by Hongbing [9, p. 61]). 
He also admitted that he had been cheated and that he was allowed to nominate 
only one member of the supervisory board of the Federal Reserve, all others were 
elected by New York bankers, which means that the government is completely 
dependent on the bankers. Plagued by remorse he confessed (before  his death): 
“I have unwittingly destroyed my country” [9, p. 89].
Control of issuing money by private banks has always been the goal of bankers. 
The effects of this were understood not only by bankers, but also by nineteenth 
century leaders of the United States and other countries.
Napoleon Bonaparte’s statement on this point dating from 1815 is clear. 
He stated that “When a government is dependent upon bankers for money, they 
and not the leaders of the government control the situation, since the hand that 
gives is above the hand that takes… Money has no motherland; financiers are 
without patriotism and without decency; their sole object is gain” (R. McNair 
Wilson, Monarchy or Money Power, London 1933, p. 68 as cited by Hongbing 
in [9, p. 25]).
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A similar view was held by the barely thirty-three year old author of the Dec-
laration of Independence (the third president of the United States) Thomas Jef-
ferson, undoubtedly representing the interests of most citizens. Worrying about 
their future he warned: “If the American people ever allow private banks to 
control the issue of currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and 
corporations that will grow around them will deprive the people of all property 
until their children wake up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered.” 
(T. Jefferson’s statement from 1787, quoted by Hongbing [9, p. 39]).
He also made a clear and decisive statement in 1802: “I believe that banking 
institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.  Already, 
they have raised up a moneyed aristocracy that has set the government at defiance. 
The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, 
to whom it properly belongs.” (T. Jefferson’s statement from 1802, quoted by 
Hongbing [9, p. 39]).
The sixteenth U.S. President Abraham Lincoln also perfectly understood 
the threat to the country and welfare of residents resulting from the printing of 
money by private banks, that is why during the Civil War, he issued $450 million 
of a new currency called “Lincoln’s greenback”. The issuance aroused a negative 
reaction of British bankers, as stated in the London Times (a newspaper rep-
resenting the interests of bankers): “If this mischievous financial policy, which 
has its origin in North America, shall become indurated down to a fixture, then 
that Government will furnish its own money without cost. It will pay off debts 
and be without debt. It will have all the money necessary to carry on its com-
merce. It will become prosperous without precedent in the history of the world. 
The brains, and wealth of all countries will go to North America. That country 
must be destroyed or it will destroy every monarchy on the globe.” (quoted by 
Hongbing in [9, p. 53]).
In view of the profits from the issue of money by private banks, the issuance 
of “Lincoln’s greenback” was opposed by the American Bankers Association. It 
expressed this in a letter to its members saying: “It is advisable to do all in your 
power to sustain such prominent daily and weekly newspapers, especially the ag-
ricultural and religious press, as will oppose the greenback issue of paper money 
and that you will also withhold patronage from all applicants who are not willing 
to oppose the government issue of money. To repeal the Act creating bank notes, 
or to restore to circulation the government issue of money will be to provide 
the people with money and will therefore seriously affect our individual profits 
as bankers and lenders. See your congressman at once and engage him to sup-
port our interest that we may control legislation.” (From a letter by the Bankers 
Association of New York, Philadelphia and Boston sent to bankers of all states in 
1877, quoted by Hongbing [9, p. 59]).
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It turns out that the issue of state debt-free money, the “Lincoln’s greenback”, 
brought a great benefit to the state. This solution has saved the government from 
taking out high-interest loans from private banks. Thanks to this, the industry, 
construction companies involved in the development of railways, agriculture 
and trade gained access to cheap credit. Based on information issued by the U.S. 
Treasury secretary in 1972, by issuing its own currency, without the need to pay 
interest to private bankers, the government saved four billion U.S. dollars in in-
terest payments (M. Sikler, Abraham Lincoln and J. F. Kennedy, “Michael” 2003 
no. 4 , quoted by Hongbing [9, p. 55]).
Although many U.S. presidents and congressmen warned against the danger 
of putting money supply in the hands of the financial elite, it was finally given 
to a private bank.
An analysis of the Federal Reserve System clearly shows that the democratic 
system that Americans are so proud of is not resistant to the threat of govern-
ment by money, because international finance, using the right to issue money, is 
gaining control of the country too.
This general conclusion makes it reasonable to consider the situation in 
Poland resulting from the issuance of money in the former People’s Republic of 
Poland and today.
3.  Brief characteristics of money issuance in poland 
during the former people’s republic of poland (prL) 
and after 1990
In Poland, during the period after World War II until the premarket trans-
formation, the issue of money (“złoty”) was not based on debt. Poland’s central 
bank (NBP) and other banks (except a few cooperatives) located throughout 
the country were government owned. In its activities, none of these banks were 
motivated by profit. Quite the contrary. Prices of loans in the Polish banking 
system were set at a level that only covered the banks’ own operating cost. They 
hovered around 2% until 1958, which provided cheap credit to rebuild the country 
after the devastation of war (as part of the three-year plan) and invest in capital-
intensive production (as part of a six-year plan, which laid the foundations of 
the Polish economy). After 1958, interest on operating loans was increased to 
4% whereas interest on investment loans was left unchanged. Until 1969, inves-
tors could benefit from low interest rates (2% per year) loans for central invest-
ments. The price of credit could be increased to 3% only as punishment in case 
the investor was not fulfilling the credit agreement (i.e. the investment was not 
13
Financialization as a Factor Constraining Economic Growth...
carried out according to plan). Additionally, loans were easily accessible for all 
types of investments, i.e. central, cooperative and business investments (an analy-
sis of loans well-documented with empirical data was presented by F. Skalniak 
[18]). In the mid-1970s a variation in the prices of loans by type of investment 
was introduced, with a preference for so-called quick-return investments. Dis-
count rates were raised to 8% for evaluating the efficiency of investments to be 
financed using bank loans. Low credit prices favored investments. Along with 
the transformation of the Polish economy (after 1989), the price of bank loans in 
Poland rose to a very high level. In recent years, the real price of loans in private 
banks, of which over 80% are foreign-owned, has been hovering around 14% 
(in the first years of transformation, the nominal price of credit was higher and 
amounted up to 120%). Moreover, loans from Polish state-owned banks sold to 
foreign investors are very difficult to get. Banks owned by foreign capital often 
demand assets of the potential debtor company valued at two to three times 
the value of the loan, as collateral for the loan. This not conducive to investing, 
nor creating and maintaining jobs.
The example of PRL shows that a country in which the government issues its 
own money can not only quickly, without incurring foreign loans, rebuild itself 
after the devastation of a war, but also eliminate unemployment. Foreign debt was 
not introduced in PRL until the 1970s when Edward Gierek took foreign loans 
for investments to modernize the economy.
To summarize this discussion concerning the issuing of money by private 
central banks, it is worth noting that at present China is a country in which 
the government directly issues currency (there is a state-owned banking system). 
In this way both the government and the public can save huge amounts of money 
by not having to repay interest on debt. This is one of the main causes of China’s 
rapid economic growth over the last 30 years and it reinforces the belief that 
China should never agree to their government giving up the right to issue money 
to a private bank, which would use state bonds as a basis for printing domestic 
currency. Whether China’s example will become a model to imitate depends on 
the awareness, strength and unity of politicians and leaders of countries who will 
be able to break free from the dictates of bankers. It also hinges on economists 
from prestigious universities worldwide, who would want to honestly explain 
the issuance of currency in economics textbooks and classrooms, and not – as is 
the case now – remain silent on the subject.
Giving the right to issue money to private banks, deregulation and the forma-
tion of giant financial entities, which (given the scope of their activities) should 
not be called “banks”, means that they are capable of controlling economic reces-
sions and financial crises to reap huge profits.
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4.  control of recessions by banks
An analysis of crises shows that banks’ control of recessions always follows 
the same scenario. First, banks relax their lending policies. They offer various 
forms of cheap credit, even nag their customers to borrow money, which ultimately 
inflates a speculative bubble. Afterwards, these banks suddenly suspend lending 
and a recession begins. There is a sudden drop in prices of fixed and various 
other assets. Once the price of high-value assets drops to a very low level, such 
as 10% of their normal value, the same bankers make bulk purchases at these 
extremely low prices. In banker’s jargon this is called “sheep shearing”. Where 
there is a private central bank “sheep shearing” reaches enormous proportions. 
Asian countries in 1997, except China that had no foreign-owned private banks, 
provide an example of such “sheep shearing”.
The elimination of the gold standard facilitates control of recessions and 
“sheep shearing” since in the absence of a gold standard, as rightly stated by 
A. Greenspan, there is no way of protecting savings from inflation: “The Gold Stan-
dard hard stops the momentum of inflation.” (A. Greenspan, Gold and Economic 
Freedom, New York 1967, pp. 100–101, quoted by Hongbing [9, p. 117]). This 
is why bankers sought to completely remove gold from its position in the mon-
etary system. This was done in three stages. First, gold was eliminated from U.S. 
circulation and monetary exchange. Second, gold was eliminated from foreign 
exchange transactions (as part of the Bretton Woods system introduced in 1944). 
The third phase ended with President Nixon moving away from the Bretton Woods 
arrangements in 1971. This decision made the U.S. dollar a debt certificate. Despite 
the elimination of the gold standard, bankers fear gold as a store of reserves, and 
therefore control its prices.
Most people believe that the transition of an economy through boom and bust 
cycles is a regularity that governs economies and that it must be so. Such reason-
ing is erroneous, because the fundamental cause of this problem is the control 
of the currency supply by world bankers. They decide when to loosen monetary 
policy, and when you tighten it. Undoubtedly, the stock market crash of 1929 and 
other crises were been planned by the Federal Reserve and European bankers.
By analyzing the current financial crisis, which came from the United States, 
it is difficult to believe that A. Greenspan, for many years governor of the Federal 
Reserve, who perfectly understood the rules governing the global economy, known 
for his reliable, even astonishing precision in forecasting trends in its transforma-
tions and development, could not foresee that the policy of the Reserve headed 
by him leads to a crisis.
As a result of giving the issuance of money to private banks, now in countries 
with market economies, such as the United States and EU countries, the principle 
applies that economic growth must be fueled by debt. It consists in the fact that 
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debt creates money, money promotes greed, greed increases debt; there is a debt 
implosion, the implosion results in deflation, which in turn leads to a recession. 
Therefore, questions arise whether, in such a situation, the governments of indi-
vidual countries, including EU countries, are able to pursue a policy of sustain-
able economic growth, if their economies can be knowledge-based and ensure 
a steady improvement of living standards of the general population, or if these 
concepts, in the present reality, are only an expression of dreams and unrealistic 
visions of theoretical economists.
Answering this question necessitates, among others, showing the impact of 
financialization on economic growth and living standards.
5.  Financialization’s impact on economic growth 
and standard of living improvement in poland  
as an eU country
For countries to achieve economic growth and development, a constant supply 
of monetary capital into the sphere of production of goods to meet the needs of 
society is required. This type of investment eliminates “casino capitalism” [21] and 
requires proper regulations concerning the issuance of money and the functioning 
of financial markets, because high profits in the financial markets are becoming 
a high alternative cost for investments in the sphere of material production and 
investments in knowledge. The creation of quasi-money and the  development of 
“casino capitalism” leads to ignoring the basic law of economics, which is: well-
being of society comes from work and the production of goods. Respecting this 
law implies that the impetus for development should result from innovations in 
the technological field, and not from preparing financial banking products for 
the needs of “casino capitalism”.
The process of financialization should not be continued because it results in 
high public debt and budget deficits, high unemployment, highly diverse incomes 
and increasing poverty. This assertion is based on empirical data from the years 
of the current financial crisis and years proceeding it (Table 1).
table 1
Public debt (as a percentage of GDP) in selected EU countries in 2007–2012
country 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012
The euro area 66.0 78.2 83.9 86.5 87.3
Germany 65.0 73.2 76.5 79.5 81.0
France 63.8 77.6 83.2 86.1 87.1
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table 1 cont.
country 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012
Greece 95.7 115.1 120.4 120.6 117.7
Italy 103.5 115.8 116.9 116.5 114.6
Spain 36.2 53.2 65.9 71.9 74.3
Portugal 63.6 76.8 70.5 70.0 -
Ireland 25.0 64.0 77.9 82.9 83.9
Belgium 84.2 96.7 100.6 101.4 100.6
Luxembourg 6.7 14.5 18.3 23.9 23.9
Netherlands 45.5 60.9 67.2 69.6 72.5
Austria 59.5 66.5 70.2 72.6 73.8
Finland 35.2 44.0 48.3 52.2 54.4
Slovenia 23.4 35.9 39.6 42.0 42.7
Cyprus 58.3 56.2 45.4 44.2 44.2
Malta 61.9 69.1 68.6 68.0 67.3
Slovakia 29.3 35.7 40.8 42.5 42.2
Poland 48.4 51.5 53.9 59.5 -
Source: [6, p. 72; 7, pp. 555–556, 574; as well as data from EU’s stabilization programs]
Data in the table above shows that EU countries, even those considered to 
be highly advanced (such as Germany, France and Belgium), have a high public 
debt. In addition, the public debt shows no downward trend. Poland is also one 
such country. In 2011, the Polish public debt went up to around 900 billion zł. 
This debt calculated on an accrual basis would represent 220% of GDP [19].
In Poland, the entire transformation period is characterized not only by high 
public debt but also high budget deficits and high unemployment at well above 
the EU average. The last budget surplus was recorded in 1989 (in PRL) before 
the start of the transition, when the issuance of money belonged to the state; 
the state issued money and banks were state-owned. During the transformation 
of the Polish economy, a negative trade balance with major foreign trade partners, 
as a result of the opening of borders to the avalanche of imports to Poland (in 
the period of the so-called Balcerowicz plan), also made an significant contribution 
to the formation of a permanent budget deficit. In 1990, the negative trade bal-
ance amounted to USD 4793 million USD, and in 2010 it was USD 13119 million. 
Such a high negative balance of trade can be associated not only with shortages 
of goods on the Polish market but also no access to credit for Polish companies, 
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a sellout of the best and most modern Polish companies to foreign capital, which 
led to the liquidation of many of them. This problem was thoroughly shown by 
W. Kieżun, who gave a list of modern Polish companies which have experienced 
“hostile takeovers” by foreign capital during the period of rapid privatization and 
now no longer exist [11, pp. 136–138], and also by J. Tittenbrun in a publication 
rightly called the four-volume work [22].
Privatization of Polish companies took place without a strategy to ensure 
long-term economic growth and development of the country. The only crite-
rion was that everything that is state-owned and Polish is bad, whereas under 
D. Tusk’s government the criterion was saving the state budget. Hence, now only 
17 of the largest 100 companies in Poland are in fact Polish [11, p. 152]. Despite 
revenues from privatization, Polish foreign debt has been increasing throughout 
the transition period (Table 2).
table 2
Polish foreign debt
parameter 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2010 
minus 
2006
Total external 
debt (in million 
Euro), including:
128 870 159 106 174 265 195 025 236 000 107 130
– public sector 
debt (%)
40.0 33.8 27.4 31.2 36.2 – 3.8
– banking sector 
debt (%)
13.8 17.2 24.5 22.0 20.6 6.8
– NGO sector and 
non-banking 
sector debt  (%)
45.5 45.5 47.0 44.9 40.4 – 5.1
Share of external 
debt (% GDP)
47.3 51.0 57.8 62.8 53.8 6.5
Source: based on [4; 8]
Furthermore, the entire transition period was characterized by low growth 
rates (as measured by % increase in GDP), which were negative in 1990 and 1991, 
in 1992 it was only 2.6% (Table 3). Only in 1995, the growth amounted to 7%. 
At this rate of growth, one can hardly expect a reduction in unemployment, 
a policy of sustainable development, the creation of a knowledge-based economy 
or a significantly reduction in the budget deficit.
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table 3
GDP growth rate, public debt and unemployment rate in Poland in 1990–2011
Year
GDp growth rate 
[%]
public debt  
[billion zł]
Unemployment rate
[%] 
1990 – 19.1 53.1 6.1
1991 – 7.1 65.8 11.5
1992 2.6 97.9 13.6
1993 3.6 133.9 15.7
1994 5.2 152.2 16.0
1995 7.0 167.2 14.9
1996 6.0 189.0 13.6
1997 6.8 221.6 10.5
1998 4.8 237.4 9.6
1999 4.1 278.2 13.0
2000 4.2 288.3 15.0
2001 1.1 314.6 17.4
2002 1.4 352.6 18.1
2003 3.8 408.6 20.0
2004 5.3 440.5 19.0
2005 3.5 477.0 17.6
2006 5.8 506.2 14.9
2007 6.7 527.4 11.2
2008 3.8 569.9 9.5
2009 1.7 687.6 12.1
2010 3.8 776.8 12.3
2011 4.3 880.7 13.2
Source: [14] 
Empirical data shows that unemployment in Poland throughout the period of 
transition remains at two-digit levels. At the outset of the Balcerowicz plan (in Janu-
ary 1990) the unemployment rate was only 0.3%, and already in December 1990 it 
was 12.2%. In the next two years, it grew to 16% as a result further bankruptcies 
of state-owned enterprises and their being subject to “hostile takeovers” [11]. In 
2003, the unemployment rate reached 20%. Unemployment levels fell only after 
the Polish accession to the EU, when a large group of young Poles left to seek 
work in EU countries. Therefore, the twenty-year transition period in employment 
and population policies deserves a definite negative assessment.
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table 4
Emigration from Poland in 2004–2009 in thousands of people
country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2009 
minus 
2004
Great Britain 150 340 580 990 650 555 405
Germany 385 430 450 490 490 415 30
Ireland 15 76 120 200 180 140 125
Netherlands 15 43 55 98 108 84 69
Italy 59 70 85 87 88 85 26
Spain 26 27 44 80 83 84 58
Total 650 986 1334 1945 1599 1363 713
Source: [2]
Very high unemployment rates and low wages for workers that persist in 
Poland undoubtedly constitute a major reason for many people moving abroad 
(Table 4). Furthermore, low wages of workers in Poland compared to other 
countries are an expression of total departure from the goals of the “Solidarity” 
movement in PRL to fight for decent wages and human dignity. Table 5 shows 
a comparison of wages in Poland, selected EU countries and the U.S. in 2010.
table 5
Average gross hourly wages in selected EU countries, the United States and Poland  
in 2010 in USD (based on an average annualized rate)
country Wages in USD
country minus 
poland
Wages in poland as a 
percentage of wages 
in other countries
Norway 55.03 46.09 16.25
Denmark 53.73 44.79 16.64
Austria 43.17 34.23 20.71
Belgium 42.17 33.23 21.20
Netherlands 38.47 29.53 23.24
Sweden 38.80 29.86 23.04
France 38.80 29.86 23.04
Great Britain 36.55 27.61 24.46
Ireland 35.06 26.66 25.54
Italy 32.10 23.16 27.85
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table 5 cont.
country Wages in USD
country minus 
poland
Wages in poland as a 
percentage of wages 
in other countries
Spain 24.55 15.61 36.41
USA 20.56 11.62 43.48
Greece 13.10 7.84 68.24
Portugal 10.29 1.35 86.88
poland 8.94 0 0
Source: [1]
Empirical data shown in the table above shows that promises of carrying out 
a market-oriented transformation resulting in Poland’s rapid development and a won-
derful capitalist future for the society did not come true. The public was deceived by 
the Solidarity movement and structures of government derived from it, because we 
are not a country of high economic growth, and besides, it does not translate into an 
improvement in standard of living of the general population, as shown by employ-
ees’ wages in Poland compared to other countries and the percentage of population 
living in relative poverty (Table 6). According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS) 
relative poverty rate is determined by a minimum (monthly) subsistence on 466 zł for 
a single-person household and 1257 zł for a four-person farming-based household.
table 6
Polish people living in relative poverty in years 2000–2010
Year percentage of population Difference (given year – 2000)
2000 17.1 0
2001 17.2 0.1
2002 18.4 1.3
2003 20.4 3.3
2004 20.3 3.2
2005 18.1 1.0
2006 17.7 0.6
2007 17.3 0.2
2008 17.6 0.5
2009 17.3 0.2
2010 17.1 0.0
Source: [3, p. 3]
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This data shows that during the last 10 years, the percentage of Poland’s 
population living in relative poverty has not only not decreased but it has in fact 
increased.
So-called working poor, who receive a minimum wage that is among the low-
est in the EU, are also common in Poland. This corresponds to a net income 
of only 1111 zł per month. Such a low minimum wage does not meet the cri-
terion for fair wages, which the Council of Europe Committee of Experts set at 
68% of the average wage in a given country’s economy. In Poland, the minimum 
wage during the entire transformation period did not exceed 40% of the average 
wage. Such low wages in Poland are justified neither by productivity nor work-
ing time [13, pp. 43–52].
A worrying phenomenon in countries with market economies, including 
Poland, is a steady increase in income disparity. The income gap is already very 
high, yet it continues to grow not only in the so-called rich countries but also in 
poor ones, including new EU members such as Poland, which until 1990 was an 
egalitarian country, with a relatively not wealthy and not diverse society in terms 
of income and now it stands out in terms of the highest income disparity (with 
the second highest income disparity in the EU). “Rich Poles match the wealth of 
financial elites in the West, whereas communities belonging to the middle class or 
the poor (the unemployed and the so-called working poor and their families) are 
in a vastly inferior position compared with their counterparts in most countries 
of the Community” [17, p. 9].
6.  Summary
The sources and effects of financialization on economic growth and living 
standards of the population of Poland, as an EU country, lead to the following 
general conclusions:
1. A growth model based on money owed and a budget deficit, implemented in 
countries with market economies, including Poland, is not appropriate, since 
it does not ensure: sustainable economic growth, implementation of the prin-
ciples of a knowledge-based economy, elimination of unemployment and 
poverty, and a steady improvement in the living standards of the general 
population.
2. Control over issuing currency by private banks is the highest form of mo-
nopoly. Only if a state issues and controls money, is it possible to provide 
a fair basis for the functioning of society.
3. Currently, banks provide a large number of complex financial products (in-
novations) and they are able to create debt using different tools. This financial 
money has the same purchasing power as real money.
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4. Foreign banks, using financial money, often implicitly, involve themselves 
in the process of issuing money even in countries where it is issued by 
the state. They also fund research into the creation of new forms of currency 
and models of the allegedly high rates of return on investments in financial 
markets. In this way, they have control over inflation and deflation, and thus 
over financial and economic crises.
5. Countries’ financial security should be an area of  strict control and supervi-
sion by their governments. Economies should focus on the production of 
material wealth by fair work that is remunerated based on the effects of work 
that is done.
6. National governments and politicians who create laws in parliaments should 
find the strength to oppose the aims of international bankers to control is-
suance of money on a global scale.
7. If societies of the world are not to become the slaves of world bankers and 
the global financial elite, it is necessary to take effective action leading to 
solutions that eliminate sources of financialization. Scientists as well should 
learn to undertake accurate research of the objective functions of manage-
ment processes and the role of money in these processes, rather than assert, 
the same way as the world’s financiers and the Bilderberg Club, that since 
globalization progresses, its effect should be one world currency and a global 
institution having the right to issue it (among others, the Nobel laureate in 
economics R. A. Mundell believes a single world currency should be intro-
duced [15]).
8. In researching the role of money in the economy, one should not forget that 
power over government is achieved by controlling the money supply. The fu-
ture will show whether countries of the world will be able to free themselves 
from the power of  bankers, or if it will remain as Rothschild stated: without 
a doubt, politics and finance have always walked arm in arm [10, p. 74].
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